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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARM MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
RICHARD KAY and MYRTLE
L. KAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
12300

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Richard Kay, age 35, and a resident of his mother's
household, filed suit against his mother, Myrtle Kay, for
damages for injuries received in a one car accident while
riding with his mother. State Farm Mutual, the insurer
for Myrtle Kay, filed an answer on behalf of Myrtle Kay,
took Richard Kay's deposition and filed a declaratory action asking the court to declare the policy of Myrtle Kay
inapplicable to afford coverage because of an exclusion
in the policy pertaining to resident relatives in the same
household. Defendants claimed the insurer waived the
exclusion by entering a defense for Myrtle Kay without
1

taking a reservation of rights and that Myrtle Kay had
been prejudiced thereby.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The declaratory action was originally assigned to
Judge Maurice Harding. Each of the three parties made a
motion for summary judgment. Judge Harding denied all
motions on the basis there was an issue of fact as to
whether there had been any actual prejudice. Counsel for
defendants suggested to Judge Harding that he disqualify
himself in the case, which he did, and the matter was referred to Judge Allen B. Sorensen. Richard Kay renewed
his motion for summary judgment to Judge Sorensen who
heard the matter on the 25th of September, 1970, and took
it under advisement pending a pre-trial conference, but on
October 8, 1970, without any further conference made a
minute entry granting a summary judgment to both defendants, ruling as a matter of law that the defendant
Myrtle Kay had been prejudiced and that the plaintiff was
estopped to assert non-coverage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have the summary judgment
of the trial court reversed and a judgment entered in favor
of the appellant holding:
That because of the exclusion in the policy the appellant is not required to continue the defense of
the action by Richard Kay against his mother
Myrtle Kay nor to pay any judgment that he may
obtain against her.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richard Kay was 35 years of age at the time of the
accident involved in this lawsuit, single and never married. He has aways lived with his parents except for three
years of service in the U. S. Army. He is an employee of
Geneva Steel and had worked for them up to the time of
the accident for approximately 10-11 years at $500.00 per
month. He turned his checks over to his mother, and she
distributed the money the way she thought she should.
She bought his clothes but kept any change coming back,
gave him money for bus fare to go to work, but no entertainment and had no savings account for him (Dep. R. Kay,
21, 27, 28, 29, 40). He had no automobile, having lost his
driver's license a few years before the present accident
because of an automobile accident wherein he had no
insurance coverage (Dep. 7, 22).
On August 4, 1968, a Sunday, Richard was riding
with his mother in her 1965 Ford Galaxie when they were
involved in a one-car accident while returning from visiting his grandparents at Nephi, Utah. His mother was
going to drop Richard off at Geneva Steel so he could go
to work (Dep. 14, 15).
She either fell asleep or had a blackout, both of which
she denied, had happened to her before (Dep. M. Kay, 18).
This occurred as they were coming out of Spanish Fork on
the freeway (Dep. M. Kay, 17).
Both Richard Kay and J\iiyrtle Kay were severely injured when the car ran off the highway and onto the
the adjacent dirt embankment.
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At the time of the accident Myrtle Kay had a liability
insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Insurance Company with major medical coverage having limits of
$5,000.00 for each occupant. (R. 6 specimen copy). The
company paid $5,000.00 to Mrs. Kay for her own medical
bills, and $5,000.00 for Richard's medical bills (Dep. M.
Kay, 21).
On or about the 15th day of July, 1969, Richard Kay
filed a suit against his mother and on the 17th of July
she was served with a summons and complaint. The complaint alleges that Richard Kay was a paying passenger
in a vehicle driven by Myrtle Kay and that she drove the
same in a negligent manner causing the accident and
plaintiff's injuries and asks for damages in the sum of
$121,000.00. The complaint does not state the relationship between plaintiff and defendant nor does it state
Richard's address at all.
The defense of the lawsuit was submitted to State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and on
August 1, 1969, an answer was filed on behalf of the
insured, Myrtle Kay, by counsel, furnished by the insurance company. With the filing of the answer a notice of
the taking of Richard Kay's deposition was served upon
his counsel and was scheduled for August 29, 1969 (R.
25 ). No contact was made with Richard Kay by the insurance Company for the purpose of obtaining his statement pertaining to the accident prior to the deposition
(R. 74).
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In Richard Kay's deposition it was determined that
he was single, unmarried and a resident of the household
of the insured Myrtle Kay and had been for many years.
The insurance policy issued to Myrtle Kay contained
the following provisions:
INSURING AGREEMENT 1.
(a) The company agrees to pay on behalf of
the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury sustained by other persons, and to
defend with attorneys selected and compensated by
the company any suit against the insured alleging
such bodily injury and seeking damages which are
payable hereunder, even if any of the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, but
the company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient.
Under the exclusions provision of said policy pertaining to insuring agreement 1 in subparagraph (i) there is
the following:
This insurance does not apply under: (i) Coverage
A to bodily injury to the insured or any member
of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured;
On October 23, 1969, the declaratory action was filed
against both Richard Kay and Myrtle Kay asking the court
to declare the policy inapplicable because of the above
policy exclusion.
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Richard Kay and Myrtle Kay each filed a motion
for a summary judgment claiming that the insurance company waived any policy defense it had by entering into
the defense of the case on behalf of Myrtle Kay. The plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, also asked
for a summary judgment based on the policy defense.
State Farm Mutual's motion for a summary judgment
was based on two points: ( 1) That no liability could exist
under the terms of the policy because of the exclusion of
coverage where the insured defendant, Myrtle Kay, and
her son, the plaintiff in the original action both resided
in the same household, and (2) That inasmuch as there
could be no coverage because of this exclusion, there is
no duty to defend and the insurance company should,
therefore, be excused from the same.
Defendants contend that the insurance company having entered into the defense of the case without having
taken a reservation of rights has waived and is estopped
from asserting any defenses to coverage it may have had
against Myrtle L. Kay prior to assuming said defense.
The motions for summary judgment were originally
heard by Judge Harding who ruled that all motions for
summary judgment should be denied, on the basis of the
rules set forth in 38 A.L.R. 2d at page 1150. The court
held further that the question of whether or not the insured was prejudiced by the assumption of the defense
was an issue of fact which he would hear (R. 60).
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Subsequently, at the suggestion of Myrtle Kay and
Richard Kay's counsel, Judge Harding disqualified himself and the matter was referred to Judge Sorensen.
Richard Kay and Myrtle Kay subsequently renewed their
motions for summary judgment, and the plaintiff State
Farm Mutual Insurance Company then took the deposition
of Myrtle Kay. On September 25, 1970, Judge Sorensen
called the matter up for hearing, at which time Judge
Harding's ruling was brought to the attention of the court.
Judge Sorensen announced that he was not inclined to
pass upon Judge Harding's ruling but would set the
matter for pre-trial (R. 78). Counsel for plaintiff indicated
that there were certain items that could be stipulated to
with respect to certain facts, and that when those were in,
the parties through their counsel would stipulate that the
matter could be heard by the court. However, prior to the
stipulations being completed and filed the court entered
a summary judgment for the defendants Richard Kay and
Myrtle Kay. The stipulations were subsequently signed
and filed and are part of the present record (R. 74, 75)
It is from this summary judgment that the plaintiff
appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF INSURANCE COMPANY HAD
A DUTY TO ENTER AN INITIAL DEFENSE TO
THE COMPLAINT OF RICHARD KAY AGAINST
MYRTLE KAY UNTIL THE COMPANY DETERMINED THE FACTS WHICH BROUGHT THE ACCIDENT WITHIN THE POLICY EXCLUSION.
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The plaintiff's complaint in the initial action alleges
that the plaintiff Richard Kay was a paying passenger in
a vehicle being driven by Myrtle Kay and that the defendant Myrtle Kay drove the vehicle in a negligent and careless manner causing the same to leave the traveled portion
of the highway and collide with the dirt embankment on
Interstate 15 approximately one-fourth mile north of
Spanish Fork, Utah; then alleges severe disabling injuries,
medical bills and loss of earnings and asks for damages
in the sum of $121,000.00. The complaint does not state
the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,
nor does it state where they lived, except that it states that
the defendant Myrtle Kay is a resident of Utah County.
The complaint, in fact, does not show the plaintiff's address on it at all.
The complaint states a prima facie cause of action by
the plaintiff against the defendant, and one which would
come within the provisions of the policy of the insured
Myrtle Kay so as to entitle her on the face of the complaint
to a defense thereto.
The majority rule and great weight of authority states
that the obligation to defend is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and if the allegations of the
complaint in the action show that the claim asserted is the
type of claim covered by the policy, then the insurance
company has a duty to defend. As an example of the cases
stating the majority rule see Sears Roebuck v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 261 Fed. 2d 774, in which the court states:
If the cause of action stated in plaintiff's pleadings
is within the coverage provided by the policy, it is
8

the insurer's duty to defend even though there may
be no evidence whatever to support the allegations
of the pleadings.
In the case of Theodore v. Zurich General Accident
and Liability Co., (Alaska, 1961), 364 P.2d 51, where the
injured party alleged facts that indicated coverage under
the liability policy, the insurer then had a duty to proceed
in defense of the suit at least to the point of establishing, if
it could, that the liability upon which the plaintiff was
relying was not, in fact, covered by the policy, and not
merely that it might not be. In the case of Pendleberry v.
Western Casualty and Surety Co., ( 1965, Ida.), 406 P.2d
129 the court held an insurer is obligated to defend even
though the complaint fails to state a claim covered by the
policy where the facts of the case, if established, present
a potential liability of the insured. In the case of Missionaries of the Company of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co., (1967, Conn.), 230 A.2d 21, the court held
the duty to defend does not depend on facts disclosed by
the insurer's independent investigation where the third
party's complaint appears to be within the coverage.
In Ohio it is long settled that the obligation to defend
exists regardless of the insurance company's ultimate liability to the insured. When a petition is filed against the
insured in which there is pleaded an action covered by the
policy, the obligation to defend arises. In Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. (Ohio, 1945), 59 N.
E. 2d 199, it has been held that such allegations of the
pleadings constitute the sole test of the insurer's duty.
See also 151 N. E. 2d 730.
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The case of Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark, N. ].
v. Pressly, (1966, Cal. App.) 53 Cal. Rep. 220 is a case
directly in point with our case as far as procedure is
concerned.
In this case the insurer issued its comprehensive personal liability policy to Baker, excluding injury caused
intentionally by or at the direction of the insured. Pressly
brought an action against Baker alleging (a) That Baker
wilfully and maliciously assaulted and injured Pressly,
including the severance of a part of Pressly's left ear and
(b) That he negligently struck, beat and bruised Pressly,
causing the described injuries.
Depositions of Pressly and Baker were taken.
The insurer then filed an action for a declaratory
judgment against Pressly and Baker and on the basis
of the depositions taken in the damage action the insurer
moved for summary judgment.
The trial court granted the motion, declaring that the
injuries sustained by Pressly were intentionally caused by
Baker and the insurer had no duty to defend Baker or to
pay any judgment which might be recovered against
Baker.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the duty
to defend is governed in the first instance by the allegations of the complaint in the damage action and here the
insurer was initially obligated to defend Baker since one
of the causes of action pleaded in the complaint alleged
negligence, but that, when it becomes certain that the
10

claim cannot eventuate in a judgment which the insurer
is obligated to pay, the duty to defend ceases, and, since
that is the situation here, the trial court acted without
error in granting the motion for summary judgment, as it
did.
In our case it appears that State Farm Mutual had a
duty to defend the injury action on the basis of the pleadings set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. As in the
Pressly case, supra, an answer was filed to plaintiff's complaint on behalf of State Farm Mutual's insured, and the
deposition of the plaintiff, Richard Kay, from whom no
statement had previously been obtained (R. 74), was
taken. Upon tying down by deposition the fact that the
plaintiff and defendant were living in the same household
and that they were mother and son, a declaratory action
was immediately filed.

POINT II
THE PROVISION IN THE INSURANCE POLICY
EXCLUDING COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY TO
THE INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY
OF THE INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME
HOUSEHOLD AS THE INSURED IS V AUD AND
ENFORCEABLE.

The exclusion providing that there is no coverage
for bodily injury to the insured or any member of the
family of the insured residing in the same household as
the insured has been passed upon by many courts and
has been held valid and enforceable and not contrary to
public policy. Examples of cases so holding are the follow11

ing: In the case of Southern Guaranty Co. v. Gipson,
(1963, Ala.), 156 So. 2d 630, the insurer issued its automobile liability policy to George Gipson who owned a
dwelling house in which he lived with his minor son and
his minor grandchild whom he had adopted, and also his
daughter, her husband, and their nine minor children, including the granddaughter adopted by George Gipson. The
daughter and her husband occupied the premises rent free
and had unrestricted access to the entire house. They occupied separate bedrooms but all used the living room in
common, as well as the kitchen. George Gipson owned
some of the furniture, and the daughter and her husband
owned other items of furniture. The whole group used
the furniture and the television, as well as some coal
heaters used to heat the house. The laundry and cooking
for the entire group was done by the daughter who used
vegetables from the garden and groceries purchased by
both her father and her husband. No effort was made to
separate the groceries for cooking, and they were served
on the table in the kitchen to the entire group. Some of
the coal was purchased by George Gipson, and some by
the husband of the daughter. The telephone was paid
for by George Gipson, and the electricity by the son-in-law.
While the minor son of George Gipson was driving the
automobile, the minor grandchild was injured. The injured grandchild and her father brought an action against
George Gipson and his son, who was the driver of the
automobile.
The insurer brought this suit for a declaratory judgment against George Gipson and others and appealed
from an adverse judgment.
12

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a decree absolving the insurer from
any responsibility to defend the suits or to pay any judgment as might be rendered in them holding ( 1) That the
injured grandchild was a member of the family of the
insured residing in the same household as the insured
within the policy exclusion which excluded coverage for
bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family
of the insured residing in the same household as the insured, and (2) That there was no merit in the contention
that the insurer was bound by an agreement made by the
local agent of the insurer after the accident, that the insurer would defend the suits since (a) liability not covered
by a policy will not be engrafted on the policy by the
mere act of the insurer in assuming control of the litigation and conducting the defense when the beneficiary is
sued upon such liability, and (b) that the mere promise
of the agent did not serve to vacate the exclusion.
In the case of Hankins v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Co., (1964, Mo.), 379 S.W. 2d 829 State Farm
Mutual issued its automobile liability policy to Elizabeth
Hankins who resided with her mother in an apartment in
Kansas City, Missouri. They occupied the same bedroom
and slept in the same bed. The policy excluded injury to
any member of the family of the insured residing in the
same household as the insured. Hankins' mother was a
passenger in an automobile operated by Hankins which
was involved in an accident resulting in injury to the
mother. The mother filed suit against the daughter
Hankins who forwarded service copies of the summons
and petition to the insurer. The insurer defended the ac-
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tion and advised Hankins that its continued defense of the
action should not be construed by her as a waiver of any
policy defense the insurer then or thereafter might
have. The Supreme Court held that there was no coverage
under the policy because of the exclusion for injury to a
member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured.
Other cases, to cite a few from other states holding
to the same effect, are as follows: National Bank of Ashland v. State Farm ·Mutual, ( 1960, Ky.), 334 S. W. 2d
261; Varnadoe ·v. State Farm Mutual, (1965, Ga.), 145
S. E. 2d 104; Keane v. State Farm ltfutual Insurance Co.,
(1966, Ga.), 152 S. E. 2d 577; Gabel v. Birds, (Mo., 1967),
422 S.W.2d 341; Tichner v. Union Insurance Co., (1968,
Mo.), 425 S.W.2d 483; National Farmers Union Property
and Casualty Co. v. Maes, ( 1965, Wisc.), 132 N.W.2d
517; American Liability Insurance Co. v. DeWitte, 64
U.S.D.C. (So. Car.), 236 Fed. Supp. 636.
POINT III
THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED W AIYER OR ESTOPPEL IS NOT V AUD TO BRING WITHIN THE
COVERAGE OF THE INSURANCE POLICY A RISK
THAT IS NOT COVERED BY ITS TERMS OR THAT
IS EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED THEREFROM.

Richard Kay and Myrtle Kay, his mother, contended
that the insurance company by entering into the defense
of the action on behalf of the insured has waived any defense which it otherwise had and is also estopped to assert
the defense of the exclusion by virtue of having undertaken the defense of the insured.
14

In this connection the cases distinguish between forfeiture provisions in a policy and exclusions. Forfeiture
provisions in a policy cover matters such as giving notice
of the occurrence of an accident, the insured cooperating
with the insurance company, forwarding to the company
demands, notices, etc.
With respect to these provisions the insurance company may be found guilty of waiving its rights or estopped
on equitable principles from asserting them because of
the position that the insured takes as a result of the insurance company's conduct.
It has been repeatedly held that the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel cannot be used to extend the
coverage of an insurance policy or create a primary
liability, but may only affect rights reserved therein. While an insurer may be estopped by its conduct or its knowledge or by statute from insisting
on a forfeiture of a policy, under no conditions can
the coverage or restrictions on coverage be extended by waiver or estoppel. Appleman, Vol. 16A,
§9090 at page 341. See also on page 344 of the
same volume the following: The doctrine of implied waiver or estoppel is not available to bring
within the coverage of an insurance policy risks
that are not covered by its terms or that are expressly excluded therefrom.
Thus in the case of Home Insurance Compan; of New
York v. Campbell Motor Co., 227 Ala. 499, 150 So. 486,
the court held one cannot extend the coverage unless the
subject matter is within the terms of the contract. In this
case the court said:
1
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What appellant seems to seek here is to make a
new contract so as to cover bodily injury or death
resulting to a passenger in the insured vehicle
when by its terms it is excluded expressly from the
contract. The doctrine of estoppel does not operate
to that effect. After a loss accrues an insurance
company may, by its conduct, waive a forfeiture
or by some act before such loss may induce the
insured to do or not to do some act which is contrary to the stipulations of the policy, and thereby
be estopped from setting up such violation as a
forfeiture; but such conduct, though in conflict
with terms of the contract of insurance, and with
the know ledge of the insured and relied upon by
him, will not have the effect to broaden such contract so as to cover additional objects of insurance
or causes of loss. The passenger exclusion endorsement which was a part of the insurance contract instantly considered relieved the appellee
from liability and assuming control of the defense
of the insured could not by estoppel enlarge the
coverage or obligate the appellee to continue representation in the suit. See also 130 So. 2d 920.
In the case of State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Cooper, 233 Fed.2d 500, 4th Cir. Lena Cooper brought a
suit against State Farm Mutual Insurance Company to
recover the amount of the judgment in the sum of
$5,000.00 which she had recovered against Jessie C.
Cooper, her husband, for injuries suffered by her as a
result of an accident to his automobile which occurred
while she was riding with him as a guest. The company
denied all liability and refused to defend the suit because
the policy under the head of exclusions expressly provided
that it should not cover any obligation of the insured to
pay damages to any member of his family residing in the
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same household with him because of bodily injury caused
by the accident and arising out of the use of the automobile.
The plaintiff contended that the insurance company was estopped to base its defense on the exclusion in the contract
because of a representation as to the nature of the policy
by the agent of the company who solicited the insurance.
The agent was reported to have told the insured that
under the law of South Carolina he had to have insurance
and, therefore, he took the policy. The court stated on
page 503 that:
Conditions going to the coverage or scope of a
policy of insurance, as distinguished from those
furnishing a ground for forfeiture, may not be
waived by implication from conduct or action. Citing cases. See also Southern Guaranty Co. v. Gipson, ( 1963, Ala.), 156 So. 2d 630, supra.
In §1135, 29A, American Jurisprudence Insurance,
at page 289, it is stated:
The rule is well established that the doctrines of
implied waiver and of estoppel based upon the
conduct or action of the insurer are not available
to bring within the coverage of a policy risks not
covered by its terms or risks expressly excluded
therefrom, and the application of the doctrines in
this respect is, therefore, to be distinguished from
the waiver of or estoppel to assert grounds of forfeiture. Thus, while an insurer may be estopped
by its conduct or its knowledge from insisting upon
a forfeiture of a policy, the coverage, or restrictions
on the coverage cannot be extended by the doctrine of waiver or estoppel. While it is true that
if the insurer, with knowledge of facts which
would bar an existing primary liability, recognizes such primary liability by treating the policy
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as in force, he will not thereafter be allowed to
plead such facts to avoid his primary liability. The
doctrine of waiver cannot be invoked to create a
primary liability and bring within the coverage
of the policy risks not included or contemplated
by its terms.
POINT IV
THERE WAS IN FACT NO W AIYER OR ESTOPPEL AND NO ACTIJAL PREJUDICE TO THE
INSURED MYRTLE KAY BY THE ASSUMPTION
OF THE DEFENSE OF MYRTLE KAY'S CASE BY
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

In 38 A.L.R. 2d at page 1150 it is stated:
The general rule is this: A liability insurer by assuming the defense of an action against the insured,
is thereafter estopped to claim that the loss resulting to the insured from an adverse judgment in
such action is not within the coverage of the policy,
or to assert against the insured some other defense
existing at the time of the accident. (Underlining
ours.) As with all broad principles this rule is subject to qualification. Thus it is established that the
rule assumes that the control of the defense by the
insurer is prejudicial to the insured, and if it appears that there was in fact no prejudice, the rule
is inapplicable.
We point out to the court that the initial action did
not proceed to judgment. As soon as the deposition of
Richard Kay was taken and it was confirmed that he was,
in fact, a resident of the household of his mother, a declaratory action was filed. The suit was filed on July 16,
1969, service was made on July 17, 1969, an answer was
18

filed on August 1, 1969, at which time Richard Kay's
deposition was noticed up for August 29, 1969. Upon receipt of the deposition and review thereof for State Farm
Mutual a declaratory action was filed on October 22, 1969.
The insurer took prompt action to deny coverage as
soon as proper proof was obtained by counsel disclosing
that the relationship of the parties to the action brought
them within the exclusion of the policy.
It is not difficult to see prejudice in most cases where
an insurer conducts the defense of the insured's case to the
point of judgment, but where the insurer proceeds with
the defense, as it is required to do under its policy, only
until it determines or develops evidence that takes the
case out of the coverage of the policy and takes action
then to deny coverage actual prejudice must be shown
and there is no presumption. Thus in the Oregon case of
Journal Publishing Co. v. General Insurance Co., 210 F.2d
202, (Oregon, 1954) it was held that although the automobile liability insurer had undertaken defense and had
filed a verified answer to a personal injury action against
the insured and had thereafter denied liability and had
withdrawn from the case on the ground that the claimant
was an employee of the insured and therefore not covered
by the policy; in view of the fact the case never reached
trial, the insured was not prejudiced by such action of the
insurer and the insurer was not estopped from denying
its obligation to defend the action.

In the case of Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark,
New Jersey v. Pressly, supra, the insurer in a declaratory
action was allowed to withdraw from the defense after
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filing an answer in the original action and taking depositions which confirmed that the actions of the insured causing the injuries were not covered by the policy.
In 38 A.L.R. 2d at page 1157 §5 it is stated:
It seems well established that if a liability insurer's
defense of an action against the insured is to work
an estoppel barring the insurer from subsequently
raising the defense of non-coverage, or some other
defense existing at the time of the accident, it must
be shown that prejudice resulted from the insurer's
conduct in defending the action against the insured.
Citing many cases under the headings of: United
States; Illinois; Kentucky; Mississippi; Missouri;
New Hampshire; New York; Oregon; Pennsylvania South Dakota; Tennessee; Vermont and Wisconsin.
In the case of Upper Columbia River Towing Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co. ( C.A. 9 Ore., 1963 ), 313 Fed.2d 702
it was held that a comprehensive liability insurer did not
waive its right to deny coverage under the policy by initially assuming defense of actions against the insured,
where as soon as the insurer determined that there was
no coverage for accidents in question it denied coverage,
and there was no evidence that the insurer's conduct
prejudiced the insured. Counsel for the insurer in this
case took depositions and secured independent medical
examinations of the plaintiffs before refusing to further
defend the actions.
In 38 A.LR. 2d page 1170 subparagraph (d) it 1s
stated:
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It seems that the most important factor to be considered in determining the timeliness of an insurer's
notice of non-waiver of defenses against the insured is the know ledge of the insurer as to such
defenses. Delay in the absence of knowledge will
not result in estoppel of the insurer if the insurer
acts promptly upon obtaining knowledge.
Support for this view is found in the following cases:
Citing cases from: California, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Vermont.
In Restighini v. Hanagan, et al., (Mass.), ( 1939), 18 N.
E.2d 1007, one of the cases cited in the above annotation,
the automobile liability insurer undertook defense of actions for injuries, removed the cases to the superior court,
filed claims for jury trials, propounded and answered
interrogatories, defended cases before the auditors, attended hearing upon auditor's draft report and withdrew from
the cases without the operator of the automobile signing
a non-waiver agreement. It was held that this conduct did
not estop the insurer from denying liability on the ground
that the cases were not covered by the policy and where
it did not appear that the plaintiff was misled.
In the case now before this court the insured has not,
m fact, been prejudiced by the defense entered on her
behalf. Prior to this accident the insured worked as a
secretary and purchasing agent for the U. S. Government
for about 23 years (Dep. M. Kay, 6).
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Richard Kay worked at Geneva Steel Company earning about $500.00 per month (Dep. R. Kay, 9). He
turned all his checks over to his mother and she gave him
back what she thought she should, like bus fare and stuff
like that (Dep. R. Kay, 11). He had no bank account
in his name (Dep. R. Kay, 12), and was not allowed
to draw on the account his mother had (Dep. M. Kay,
10). Richard didn't have much social life and went with
his mother, or mother and father when his father was
alive. What they did he did, and he didn't have too much
demand for money. Mrs. Kay did most of the handling
of the clothes for Richard (Dep. M. Kay 12). She
took him to the attorney's office to discuss the filing of a
lawsuit (Dep. M. Kay, 22, 23). Richard still lives
with her and there is no enmity between them as a result
of the lawsuit (Dep. M. Kay, 19), and she has no
difficulty generally getting Richard to follow her suggestions (Dep. M. Kay, 24).
Estoppel is the equitable doctrine that a party should
not be permitted to repudiate an act done or position assumed where that course would work an injustice to
another who, having ample reason to do so has relied
thereon. An estoppel may arise even where there is no
intent to mislead, as long as one's conduct is sufficient to
induce reasonable reliance on the part of the other. The
party estopped must have acted with the knowledge of
the facts. However, the final element which must always
be present in an estoppel is a change of position by the
relying party with prejudice for injuries suffered as a
proximate cause of such reliance.
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There has been no change of position by Mrs. Kay
with prejudice for injuries suffered by her as a proximate
cause of any reliance and the insurer was not aware of the
actual facts with respect to the son's residency with his
mother until after his deposition was taken.
CONCLUSION
The insurer had a duty under the policy to undertake
the defense of the action on behalf of the insured as the
complaint stated a cause of action covered by the policy.
Prompt action was taken by the insurer to take the deposition of Richard Kay, and as soon as it was determined that
he resided with his mother under circumstances bringing
the accident within the exclusion provision of the policy
a declaratory action was filed and a denial of coverage
made thereby. The insured was not prejudiced by such
action and the insurer should not be estopped from denying liability. The summary judgment entered by Judge
Sorensen should be reversed and judgment entered m
favor of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI
By L. L. Summerhays
604 Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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